In short: In October 2026 the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published the final version of IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards. It sets the schedule most of the technology industry will follow: RSA, elliptic-curve signatures and classical key exchange are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards after 2035, at every approved key size. Banks, fintechs, insurers, healthcare providers, government suppliers and any business that must keep data confidential for years should start with an inventory of where cryptography is used, because NIST notes that earlier cryptographic transitions took 10 to 20 years.
Key takeaways
- NIST IR 8547 (final, October 2026) deprecates quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows them after 2035. NIST's earlier guidance had only planned to disallow 112-bit strength keys from 1 January 2031.
- The schedule covers RSA, ECDSA and EdDSA signatures and Diffie-Hellman, MQV and RSA key establishment, at every approved security strength.
- The replacements are ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment, with ML-KEM-768 as NIST's recommended default, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for signatures. HQC has been selected as a second key-establishment algorithm.
- The UK's NCSC asks organisations to finish discovery and a plan by 2028, priority migrations by 2031 and everything by 2035. The UAE approved a National Encryption Policy in November 2025 that requires government entities to adopt approved transition plans.
- Widely used software has started: OpenSSL 3.5 offers the hybrid X25519MLKEM768 key exchange by default.
What is post-quantum cryptography?
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a family of public-key algorithms designed to stay secure against a large quantum computer. Today's public-key cryptography, RSA and elliptic curves, protects almost every website, VPN, banking API, software update and digital signature. A sufficiently large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could break it. No such machine exists today, but NIST names the reason to act now: "harvest now, decrypt later", where an attacker records encrypted traffic today and decrypts it once the technology matures. Data that must stay secret for ten years, such as health records, contracts, national ID data or banking history, is already exposed to that risk.
Symmetric cryptography, such as AES with 128-bit keys or more, is much less affected. NIST says its approved symmetric primitives at 128 bits or more are believed to meet its lowest post-quantum security category, so encrypted databases and disks are not the urgent part of this work.
This guide is written by the ApexlyTech team at Apexly Technologies (Pvt) Ltd, which builds and maintains web platforms, mobile apps, APIs and cloud systems for businesses in Pakistan, the Gulf and elsewhere.
What does the final NIST IR 8547 say?
| Algorithm family | Used for | NIST status |
| RSA (2048-bit and above) | TLS certificates, code signing, document signatures, key transport | Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035 |
| ECDSA and EdDSA | TLS, mobile app and API signatures, e-invoice stamps, firmware | Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035 |
| Diffie-Hellman and elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman | Key exchange in TLS, VPNs and messaging | Deprecated after 2030, disallowed after 2035 |
| ML-KEM (FIPS 203) | Post-quantum key establishment | Approved; ML-KEM-768 recommended default |
| ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) | Post-quantum digital signatures | Approved |
The final text is stricter than the 2024 draft in one practical way: the 2030 deprecation now applies whatever the key size, so a 3072-bit RSA key or a P-256 elliptic curve key is not a way to postpone the work. NIST also confirms that hybrid key establishment, which combines a classical and a post-quantum algorithm, can be validated under FIPS 140 as long as one input comes from an approved scheme.
For US federal agencies the dates are earlier. Under Executive Order 14412 and OMB Memorandum M-26-15, high value assets and high impact systems must adopt post-quantum key establishment by 31 December 2030 and post-quantum signatures by 31 December 2031, and agencies must support TLS 1.3 by 2 January 2030.
Why does a US standard matter in Pakistan and the Gulf?
Because the products you buy follow it. Operating systems, browsers, cloud load balancers, hardware security modules, payment terminals and libraries such as OpenSSL implement NIST's algorithms, and FIPS 140 validation is a common requirement in bank and government tenders. Customers in the US, UK and EU will also start asking about post-quantum plans in security questionnaires. In the Gulf, the UAE Cybersecurity Council oversees a national migration under the National Encryption Policy, which requires government entities to prepare officially approved transition plans; suppliers to those entities should expect the question to reach them.
Which of your systems are exposed?
| Area | Why it matters | Typical first step |
| Websites and public APIs | Recorded TLS traffic can be decrypted later | Enable hybrid key exchange where the server software supports it |
| VPNs and site-to-site links | Carry bulk internal data, often for years | Ask the vendor for its PQC firmware roadmap |
| Mobile apps | Certificate pinning and custom crypto code are hard to change once shipped | Remove hard-coded algorithms; plan an app update path |
| Signed documents and e-invoices | Signatures must verify for years; schemes such as ZATCA's use elliptic-curve signatures today | Track the authority's guidance; do not change on your own |
| IoT devices and payment terminals | Ten-year lifetimes, firmware signed with today's keys | Make post-quantum support a purchase requirement |
| Internal PKI and HSMs | Root keys last decades | Check HSM support for ML-KEM and ML-DSA |
A post-quantum migration plan you can start now
- Name an owner. Post-quantum migration touches infrastructure, application teams, vendors and procurement; it needs one accountable person and a small budget line.
- Build a cryptographic inventory. List where public-key cryptography is used: certificates, TLS endpoints, VPNs, SSH, code signing, document signing, tokens, libraries and hardware. A cryptographic bill of materials sits naturally next to the software bill of materials many firms already keep.
- Rank data by how long it must stay secret. Ten-year data, such as medical, identity, legal and banking records, moves first because of harvest-now-decrypt-later.
- Ask every vendor for a roadmap. Cloud, CDN, VPN, HSM, POS, ERP and core banking suppliers should state which versions support ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and when.
- Turn on hybrid TLS where you can. OpenSSL 3.5 already offers X25519MLKEM768 by default; test your load balancers, proxies and firewalls, some of which reject the larger handshake.
- Make your own code crypto-agile. Algorithms should be configuration, not constants scattered through the codebase.
- Write post-quantum support into procurement. Anything with a life beyond 2030, from payment terminals to IoT gateways, should have a supported upgrade path.
- Set milestones. The NCSC's 2028, 2031 and 2035 dates are a sensible frame even outside the UK.
What does it cost, and what drives the cost?
The algorithms themselves are free and already in mainstream libraries. The cost sits in discovery, testing and replacing equipment that cannot be upgraded. Post-quantum keys and signatures are also larger: an ML-KEM-768 public key is 1,184 bytes and its ciphertext 1,088 bytes, and an ML-DSA-65 signature is 3,309 bytes, against tens of bytes for elliptic curves. That rarely matters for a website, but it can matter for constrained IoT links, smart cards and protocols with fixed message sizes, which is why those systems need testing early. Firms that fold this work into planned upgrades of servers, terminals and apps spend far less than firms that wait for a deadline.
Technical notes for engineering teams
Prefer libraries that already implement FIPS 203 and 204 rather than writing your own. Use hybrid key exchange first, since it keeps classical security while adding post-quantum protection. Check middleboxes: larger TLS client hellos can be split across packets, and older inspection appliances may drop them. For signatures, plan for certificates and tokens that grow in size, and test mobile and embedded clients for memory and bandwidth. Keep the inventory in version control and update it with each release, as you would an SBOM; our guide to EU Cyber Resilience Act reporting and SBOMs covers that habit, and our npm supply chain guide covers keeping dependencies honest.
How ApexlyTech can help
We build and maintain web platforms, APIs, mobile apps and cloud systems, and we can run a cryptographic inventory of your applications, upgrade TLS stacks and libraries, remove hard-coded algorithms from your code and test hybrid post-quantum key exchange across your infrastructure. See our custom software development and cloud solutions services, or contact us to discuss a post-quantum readiness review.
Frequently asked questions
When will RSA stop being allowed?
Under NIST IR 8547, published in final form in October 2026, RSA and other quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed under NIST standards and guidelines after 2035, at every approved key size. US federal high-value systems face earlier deadlines of 2030 for key establishment and 2031 for signatures.
Is there a quantum computer that can break RSA today?
No. No publicly known quantum computer can break RSA or elliptic-curve cryptography today. The reason to act now is harvest now, decrypt later: data recorded today could be decrypted in future, so information that must remain confidential for many years is already at risk, and NIST notes that past transitions took 10 to 20 years.
What is hybrid post-quantum key exchange?
Hybrid key exchange combines a classical algorithm, such as X25519, with a post-quantum one, such as ML-KEM-768, so the connection stays secure if either holds. OpenSSL 3.5 offers X25519MLKEM768 by default, and NIST confirms hybrid schemes can be FIPS 140 validated if one component is an approved algorithm.
Does the UAE require post-quantum cryptography?
The UAE approved a National Encryption Policy and its executive regulation in November 2025. As reported by WAM, it calls on government entities to develop clear, officially approved plans to move to post-quantum cryptography, with the UAE Cybersecurity Council overseeing the migration. Private suppliers to government should expect related requirements.
Where should a mid-sized business start?
Start with an inventory of where public-key cryptography is used, rank systems by how long their data must stay secret, and ask your main vendors for their post-quantum roadmaps. Then enable hybrid TLS where your software supports it and add post-quantum support to purchase requirements for long-lived equipment.
Sources
All sources checked 10 November 2026.